Summary of this article
Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 confined maternity benefits for adoptive mothers to cases where the child was below three months of age.
The SC recognised that the objective of maternity benefits is not confined to protection of the biological act of childbirth, but extends to the broader social and emotional role of motherhood.
What lends the judgment its depth is not merely its outcome, but the method adopted by the Court.
Some judgments fix a provision. Others correct a presumption. The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India & Ors belongs to the latter category.
In this case, the Court noted that maternity benefits to adoptive mothers can't be limited to children less than three months old as per the Social Security Code, 2020, as it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
“Importantly, it recognised that the objective of maternity benefits is not confined to protection of the biological act of childbirth, but extends to the broader social and emotional role of motherhood, and that this does not change based on the manner in which the child is brought into the life of the beneficiary mother,” says Vinay Joy, Partner at Khaitan & Co.
Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 confined maternity benefits for adoptive mothers to cases where the child was below three months of age.
“At first glance, the condition appears administratively tidy. In practice, it was exclusionary. Anyone familiar with the CARA adoption process understands that completion of a lawful adoption is rarely achieved within such a narrow window. By the time the legal process concludes, the child is almost always older. The provision did not meaningfully regulate eligibility; it extinguished it,” says Aarushi Jain, Founding Partner, Chambers of Jain and Kumar.
The Supreme Court declined to sustain a restriction so detached from lived reality.
What lends the judgment its depth is not merely its outcome, but the method adopted by the Court. Instead of reading the provision in isolation, the bench returned to first principles: what is maternity legislation intended to secure?
The answer is neither formal nor biological. It lies in enabling care, facilitating emotional bonding, and allowing a mother and child the time necessary to build a relationship. Measured against this purpose, the three-month threshold became indefensible. If anything, an adopted child entering a new familial environment requires equal, if not greater, parental presence beyond that period.
The Article 14 analysis follows naturally. A classification must bear a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. The age-based cut-off bore no such nexus. It found no justification in child welfare, caregiving needs, or the realities of adoptive parenthood. The Court was therefore correct in striking it down.
“The more enduring contribution of the judgment, however, lies in its articulation of motherhood. The Court distances itself from biology and situates motherhood within care, responsibility and the day-to-day labour of parenting. Although this idea of motherhood is nothing new in the abstract, expressing it through a constitutional lens of equality and dignity gives it doctrinal weight. It also corrects a long-standing tendency in law and policy to treat adoptive parenthood as secondary. The judgment rejects that hierarchy unequivocally,” observes Aarushi Jain.
From a practitioner’s perspective, the impact is immediate. We have seen, in advisory and contentious matters alike, adoptive mothers being denied leave benefits on the basis of narrow and often mechanical interpretations of the statute. This decision equips them with a clear constitutional foundation to assert their rights.
Another important aspect of the ruling was how it dealt with child welfare. “Adoption is a delicate process for the child and they are emotionally and developmentally fragile. The quality and continuity of early caregiving in this phase are critical. A legal regime that denies an adoptive mother the opportunity to provide that care fails not only the parent but the child as well,” says Jain.
India continues to lack a comprehensive, gender-neutral parental leave framework. What exists is fragmented and uneven in its application. This judgment addresses one specific inequity within that broader legislative gap. It is now for Parliament to carry the exercise forward in a more holistic manner.
For practitioners, the principle that emerges is clear: welfare legislation must be interpreted in a manner that advances its purpose. Where a statutory classification undermines that purpose, it cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
“Hamsaanandini Nanduri is, in that sense, a decision that will travel well beyond its immediate facts,” says Jain.
